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This study investigates whether trade-related, targeted, government policies had an impact on the 
total factor productivity (TFP) of manufacturing firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA region) 
between 1995 and 2009. It does so by looking at how different types of primarily industry-specific trade 
policies (or their combinations) impacted firm productivity.  
The dependent variable is firm total factor productivity (TFP), calculated using the Levinsohn-
Petrin approach. As an alternative measure of firm productivity, this study uses labor productivity. 
This study finds that, in most instances (10 out of 14 times), targeted policies do not show a 
significant impact on manufacturing firms’ TFP. Based on the analysis of 588 manufacturing firms in the 
ECA region, this study finds that, contrary to proponents of targeted policies, targeted trade-related 
government policies have a limited impact on the total factor productivity (TFP) in developing countries. 
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Recently, there have been several successful examples of government-initiated trade-related 
policies aimed to develop targeted industries, such as providing reduced tariffs for imported equipment, 
thereby facilitating technology adaptation, providing access to expert consultants to help firms adhere to 
global standards, and simplifying customs procedures.  Examples of  these industries include,  floriculture 
in Kenya, salmon farming and wine production in Chile, grapes, maize farming, and software 
development in India, fisheries in Uganda, electronics in Taiwan and Malaysia (Chandra, 2006), and 
shrimp in Nigeria (Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS), 2007), to name a few. Such targeted 
policy measures came from recognition that, apart from a small market or poor business climate, these 
countries’ products often failed to meet the sophisticated standards required to trade within the global 
markets. In addition to the standards, it was found that even in labor-intensive industries, such as apparel, 
labor costs were not always the driving force behind sector productivity, e.g., total factor productivity 
(TFP) – broadly understood as a “...portion of output not explained by the amount of inputs used in 
production and, as such, its level is determined by how efficiently and intensely the inputs are utilized in 
production” (Comin, 2006: 1). Instead, variables, such as high import tariffs on key inputs like machinery 
and equipment (e.g., Kenya, apparel industry), delays in value added tax (VAT) redemption for exporters 
(e.g., textile industry in Indonesia, cashew nut industry in Brazil (FIAS, 2007; USAID, 2008)), lengthy 
procedures to clear customs, failures to meet global industry standards, and outdated technologies were 
acting as the major hurdles. In these examples, the respective governments helped firms in nascent 
industries to overcome such hurdles and become more productive by implementing industry-specific, 
trade-related targeted reforms. Targeted government trade-related policies encompass primarily industry-
specific, trade-related government initiatives aimed to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers, set up 
proactive bodies to assist producers to acquire and adapt new technologies, and to adhere to global 
standards. The final goal of such interventions is to help producers move along the value chain. Given 




that the targeted reforms are mostly of a short- to -medium-term nature, they allow governments to 
leapfrog development by focusing their resources on developing sectors that would bring high inflows of 
foreign exchange. 
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing debate on government intervention and 
whether such intervention should be targeted or not (Lin and Chang, 2009). This study attempts to 
evaluate whether such government intervention is beneficial for firm performance, specifically measured 
by total factor productivity (TFP). We argue that trade-related, targeted, government policies have an 
impact on manufacturing firm TFP in developing countries. 
In addition to evaluating the effect of government trade policies on firm productivity, this paper 
disentangles as much as is possible the mechanisms by which firms achieve higher productivity (raised by 
Topalova and Khandelwal, 2010) and disaggregates the effects of different types of trade policies (or their 
combinations) on firm productivity in developing and emerging markets (raised by Rodriguez and 





This paper disaggregates different types of industry-specific trade policies (or their combinations) 
and measures their impact on firm productivity. This study stresses that the trade-related policies will be 
particularly beneficial for a country’s economic growth if they are targeted at sectors that offer the most 
export potential and utilize a country’s resource abundances in a more effective and efficient manner. The 
importance of using attributes at hand (e.g. cheap labor, access to resources, and access to skilled labor) in 
order to exploit competitive advantage to the full extent has been supported by the resource-based view 
and the concept of competitive advantage (Porter, 1990).  
To date, the literature has addressed the impact of trade liberalization and protection on firm 
performance. Exporting leads to an increase in expected profits, which induce higher entry and push up 




the productivity threshold for survival. The least efficient firms tend to contract in a Schumpeterian wave 
of “creative destruction” while the most productive firms tend to expand. Apart from the rationalization 
and reallocation effects, the pro-competitive forces of trade liberalization may also induce within-firm 
productivity changes. Competition may force firms to lower their average cost curves (Helpman and 
Krugman, 1985), reduce managerial inefficiencies (Hicks, 1935; Rodrik, 1992), use inputs more 
efficiently (Holmes and Schmitz, 2001), and focus on the products that represent their core competency 
(Bernard, Redding, and Schott, 2006). Competition is also likely to make domestic firms invest more in 
new technologies and production processes in order to prevent foreign competitors from coming in 
(Aghion, Burgess, Redding, and Zilibotti, 2005).  
In addition to competitive pressures, the trade literature also predicts that better access to superior 
inputs and technology can also lead to productivity improvements (Ethier 1982; Grossman and Helpman 
1991; Riviera-Batiz and Romer, 1991). While lower tariffs on final goods induce higher import 
competition, lower tariffs on intermediate inputs induce learning, innovation and quality effects 
(assuming that domestic firms are able to adopt such technologies). Empirical studies by Muendler 
(2004), Shor (2004), Amiti and Konings (2007), among others, find that the largest productivity gains 
arise from reducing the tariffs on intermediate inputs.  
While the trade literature has addressed the impact of trade liberalization and protection on firm 
performance, disentangling the exact mechanisms by which firms achieve higher productivity still 
remains a challenge (Topalova and Khandelwal, 2010). For that purpose, the value chain analysis 
represents an invaluable tool that allows identifying the relevant trade-related policies and studying them 
in a comprehensive manner. The value chain analysis is ― “…a method for accounting and presenting 
the value that is created in a product or service as it is transformed from raw inputs to a final product 
consumed by end users” (IFC FIAS, 2007). The study uses the value chain analysis to define how the 
trade policies enter the basic value chain (see Figure 1.1). The trade policies that enter the different stages 
of the basic value chain are the policies concerning the VAT (value added tax) redemptions, import tariffs 
on intermediate inputs, non-tariff barriers, adherence to industry standards, and proactive bodies aimed to 




assist value chain participants. The value chain analysis provides a single framework that encompasses all 
the relevant trade-related policies and allows for a more comprehensive analysis of how trade affects firm 
productivity.  
Unlike most previous research that used value chain analysis to upgrade performance of firms, 
this research looks at it as a tool for trade development at a national level (International Trade Forum).
 
Improving the performance of individual firms may be inadequate unless the trends in global trade flows 
are taken into consideration through a strategy that facilitates performance of the entire sector or at least 
its key players. By analyzing the way in which producers are connected to final markets, disaggregating 
the trade policies and distinguishing effects of different types of trade policies across different sectors and 
countries with different comparative advantages,
1
 this research aims to address the questions raised by 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) in their analysis of how trade benefits economic growth.  
We argue that industry-specific policies do, in fact, play a dominant role in improving the 
performance of individual firms, facilitating greater exports and efficiently utilizing a country’s 
abundances. The study makes a proposition that industrial policies are most effective in increasing 
manufacturing firm productivity when they are targeted at the industries with the largest export potential. 
  
                                           
1
 A country‘s “comparative advantage” is determined by its factor endowments, such as labor, skills, capital, 
technology and natural resources. The traditional theory of international trade sees comparative advantage as the 
main determinant of trade. A country is assumed to specialize in those industries that make intensive use of factors 
with which the country is relatively well endowed. More recent trade theory has highlighted the importance of 
product differentiation which can explain the incidence of intra-industry trade (Gerber, 2011). 





 H1: Industry Protection: Industry protection is negatively correlated with firm TFP. 
 H2: Trade Agreements: International and regional trade agreements are positively correlated 
with firm TFP.  
 H3: Import Tariffs: Imports tariffs on key inputs are negatively correlated with firm TFP.  
 H4: Value-Added Tax: Value added tax (VAT) on imported materials is negatively correlated 
with firm TFP.  
 H5: Value-Added Tax: Time period to reinstate the VAT is negatively correlated with firm TFP. 
 H6: Export Processing Zone: Firm’s location in the export processing zone is positively 
correlated with firm TFP.  
 H7: Non-Tariff Barriers: Number of days to clear customs is negatively correlated with firm 
TFP.  
 H8: Non-Tariff Barriers: Number of documents to clear customs is negatively correlated with 
firm TFP.  
 H9: Non-Tariff Barriers: Cost to import/export is negatively correlated with firm TFP.  




We tested the hypotheses on a panel of manufacturing firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
between 1995 and 2009. The regional emphasis is important because of the region’s several unique 
characteristics. The World Bank study (World Bank, 2008) shows that when compared to other parts of 
the world, the Eastern Europe and Central Asia (henceforth, ECA) region experienced one of the largest 
growth in TFP between 1999 and 2005 due to reallocation of labor and capital across sectors. Moreover, 
the ECA region experienced the largest economic contraction in the world as a result of a global financial 
crisis (World Bank, 2010). Such a significant increase in productivity in the face of a severe economic 
contraction represented an impressively large disparity in economic performance, as compared to other 
world regions, in a relatively short period of time. Studying a region with such a distinct performance 
allows seeing results more clearly as opposed to studying another region which had an average 
performance over the same period of time.  




Also, there is a large heterogeneity within the region itself. As a result of a socialist regime that 
ended in the early 1990s, the ECA region offers a somewhat similar institutional environment. Yet, there 
is a drastic difference in economic performance, especially between the Central and Eastern Europe 
countries and the former Soviet republics (Campos and Coricelli, 2002). During its transformation 
process from the socialist regime, the ECA region has undergone significant reforms. Most of these 
reforms were required as consequence of its membership in the World Trade Organization, or its 
membership in a regional block. The largest component of these reforms was trade-related. Given such 
heterogeneity in economic performance, this region makes it a perfect sample to study the productivity 
changes induced by the trade-related policies while controlling for the effect of institutions.  
The period from 1995 to 2009 has been selected because it represents a period of major changes 
in trade policies in the Eastern Europe and Central Asia region. It also provides the most consistent data 
sets as most former Soviet countries have missing data points well up to 1993/1994 due to collapse of the 
socialist regimes and the ensuing confusion and political and economic transformation to market-based 
economies.  
There are several reasons why this study focuses on the manufacturing sector, as opposed to 
agriculture, mining, or services. Over the last 60 years, the exports of manufactured products have 
surpassed the exports of agricultural, fuels and mining products, and services (WTO, 2010; UNCTAD, 
2011). In 2008, for example, manufactured products accounted for 59% of developing economies’ trade, 
while agricultural products accounted for only 8% (WTO, 2010).  
In addition, studies by established economists such as Rodrik (2006) confirm that rapidly growing 
countries are characterized by large manufacturing sectors. As a result of technological innovations in 
tools and equipment, productivity in manufacturing sectors will likely continue to increase, while 
production of services, especially in labor-intensive sectors that rely on human interaction, such as 
nursing, teaching, performing arts, may have little or no productivity growth over time. Nurses, teachers, 
or waiters can increase the volume of provided services, however, it can be difficult to achieve without a 
decline in the quality of the service (Iversen and Wren, 1998).  




Specifically in the ECA region, the merchandise trade is characterized by large exports of 
manufactures and fuels (see Figure 1.2). This study focuses on manufactures because a broad-based 
manufacturing sector offers more market opportunities than sectors based on few primary-based products 
(Rodrik, 2006). The manufacturing sector offers greater linkage and spillover effects, as opposed to 
agriculture or mining sectors, with technological change flowing mainly from manufacturing to other 
sectors (Szirmai, 2009).  
Variables and Measures 
The dependent variable is the firm total factor productivity (TFP). The difficulty in calculating 
firm total factor productivity from the production function arises because of the correlation between 
unobserved productivity shocks and input decisions. Therefore, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation 
yields inconsistent estimators. To address these issues the research follows the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) 
approach. The Levinsohn and Petrin (henceforth, LP) estimator is based on the assumptions similar to 
those of Olley and Pakes (1996) about the timing of a firm’s input choices, their change over time, and 
the productivity process of a firm. However, it is less demanding in terms of required data; in this 
approach, intermediate inputs are used as a proxy for unobserved productivity shocks.  
The main independent variables of interest are trade-related policies listed in Table 1.1. The 
trade-related policies are comprised of a set of variables that measure overall industry protection, 
membership in international and regional trade agreements, import tariffs, value-added taxes, and the 
presence of export processing zones, non-tariff barriers, and industry standards. Each of these variables is 
measured by several proxies. This table has been developed based on the Foreign Investment Advisory 
Service framework (IFC FIAS, 2007). The industry-specific value chain approach presented in the FIAS 
report is designed to facilitate formulating a targeted reforms agenda to support the private sector 
development. It allows analyzing the trade-related policies concerning tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
compliance with the industry standards and other market issues in a comprehensive manner. Apart from 
presenting a sound analytical framework, it also offers a practical approach for using the value chain 
analysis as a tool to identify impediments to industry growth and it serves as a basis for the development 




of targeted policies. Such policies help achieve a better access to intermediate inputs and to understand 
the obstacles to greater integration of a targeted industry with the global market.
2
  
To see if the trade-related policies should be targeted at industries within a country’s comparative 
advantage, we start with identifying the industries with high/growing economic rents, or top export 
industries. Table 1.2 for Armenia summarizes the methodology for industry selection. The industries with 
high/growing economic rents are selected according to the US dollar value of a nation’s goods exports 
across 36 clusters in 2007. They are the most prominent in the country’s export portfolio. The research 
utilizes the data and the methodology developed by M. Porter and the Institute for Competitiveness at 
Harvard University to identify top export clusters. When unavailable, the data on top export commodities 
are taken from the UN Commodity Trade database (UN Comtrade). Based on the firm’s main product 
highlighted in its reported ISIC code in the Enterprise Surveys (World Bank), the study categorizes the 
firm into the corresponding top four export clusters. When missing firms in that cluster, the study skips 
the cluster with a missing firm data and assigns that rank to the following cluster. The cut-off threshold is 
top 10 clusters (highlighted in grey). 
3
 In the further analysis, to distinguish the most important industries, 
the study uses the dummy variable for the industries that rank as top 4 in a country’s export portfolio in 
the ECA region.  
In terms of control variables, most studies find that the most productive firms tend to be large, 
exporting and foreign-owned. Dabla-Norris, Kersting, and Verdier (2010) identified that large, 
predominately exporting and privately owned (by foreign or domestic private interests) firms tend to be 
the most productive. Bernard, Stabilito, and Yoo (2010) have also confirmed that larger firms tend to be 
                                           
2
 We also developed a table that identifies the key intermediate inputs used in each industry (see Table 1.3). It is 
based principally on the major capital equipment required for each firm to manufacture their products. 
3
 For example, there were no firms representing the Jewelry, Precious Metals and Collectibles cluster in Armenia, or 
firms in the Plastics cluster in Azerbaijan, thus the study had to go down to the next cluster. When the industries are 
represented by firms outside of the top four clusters, these industries were assigned a rank value of 0. The reason the 
study had missing firms in certain clusters is because of the nature of the Enterprise Surveys data. To keep 
comparability with previous surveys and across countries, the two industries were selected in all countries: the 
manufacture of food products and beverages, and manufacture of apparel and fur. Other industries that were added 
to the survey do not necessarily represent the firms within the top 10 clusters. The study keeps the foregoing 
comment in mind when interpreting the final results. 




more efficient, especially if they are foreign-owned; such firms are most likely to self-select into 
exporting. In terms of labor skills, Escribano and Guasch (2005) find external training and having a 
fraction of the staff engage in R&D to be particularly important for the productivity of smaller firms. 
Productivity in larger firms seems to benefit more from the quality certifications, as well as having the 
ability to upgrade to machinery which is controlled by computers (especially in old and large firms). 
Additionally, it was noted that the more educated the staff was, the greater the level of productivity was 
achieved. Based on these observations, the study uses the control variables, which include firm size, age, 
ownership (foreign versus domestic, private or state ownership, or publicly-traded status), as well as 
exporter/importer status, and labor skills. Table 1.4 describes the proxies for these variables and their 
units of measurement.  
Method of Analysis 
To model the effects of the industry and country levels, the study uses a two-level HLM 
technique. Specifically, a two-level HLM model is used to test the effects of j industries (level 1) nested 
within k=1, … K countries (level 2). The model is as follows: 
TFPjk   = β0k + β1k Controljk + β2k Tradejk  +  εjk              (1.1) 
Level 2: the coefficients at level 1 are treated as outcomes to be predicted. 
 β0k = γ00 + γ01 Tradek + u0k                       (1.2) 
β1k = γ10 + γ11 Tradek + u1k           (1.3) 
  β2k = γ20 + γ21 Tradek + u2k                  (1.4) 
Where: 
TFPjk   = log-level of firm total factor productivity aggregated to the industry-level j in country k  
Controljk = control variables (i.e., firm characteristics) of firm i aggregated to the industry-level j in 
country k  
Tradejk  = the vector of industry-level trade policies in industry j and country k, (fixed effects) 
Tradek  = the vector of country-level trade policies in country k, (fixed effects) 
β, γ  = regression coefficients 
εij,t,  u0k,  u1k, u2k   = iid random terms determined independently of production inputs (random effects) 




The fixed effect would refer to the overall effect of a trade-related policy on firm productivity. 
The random effect gives information on whether or not this effect differs between countries.  
Data sources 
The study uses a firm-level survey of a private sector collected by the World Bank through the 
Enterprise Surveys (ES) in various developing and emerging markets. The dataset is publicly available at 
the World Bank Enterprise Surveys website.
4
 Businesses surveyed include manufacturing, retail, 
construction, transport, communication, and other services. The Enterprise Surveys contain information 
necessary to calculate firm-level productivity, or TFP indices. These include annual sales, employment 
(total hours worked per year), labor costs, and net book value of capital stock. The database provides the 
nominal values of the variables due to the lack of price indices (see Table 1.5). From a range of available 
datasets, the study uses the “panel” dataset, which covers the time period of 2005 and 2009. The study 
uses the manufacturing firm TFP data for the year of 2009 as the benchmark to gauge the effect of 
targeted trade-related policies. The study excludes all the services industries; thus, it focuses on industries 









 The Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) region includes: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. However, the study had to drop Serbia due to the lack of 
reliable data (due to the nature of the survey, most of firms in Serbia dropped out of the survey and have been 
replaced with other firms’ data). That prevented the study from being able to calculate firm total factor productivity 
which requires at least two years of data. The data on trade policies is mostly absent for Turkmenistan as well. 





Table 1.7 provides the summary statistics. Tables 1.8-1.9 provide correlation matrices. The firm 
characteristics have been aggregated to the industry-level. It appears that the sample is somewhat 
uniformly distributed in terms of firm size. In terms of previous state ownership, there are more non-state 
firms that are in the top 4 export industries.  
Testing the hypotheses requires conducting a hierarchical linear modeling analysis on the 
relationship between the value of firm total factor productivity and firm control variables (aggregated to 
the industry-level) without including industry protection in the model. The results of the empty model are 
displayed in Table 1.10 (see Model 1a). The sample has 26 countries. The average productivity level 
(based on LP) across countries, reflected in the intercept term, is 65.35676 (γ00). Results indicate that the 
variance in the intercepts of the lines that represent the different countries (i.e. the variance across 
countries) is equal to 381.9. Because these estimates are larger than their standard errors, there appears to 
be significant variations in country means. To partition the variance across levels, the following variance 
components can be used. In the LP case, the intra-class correlation coefficient for the country level is 
equal to [381.9/(2353.4+381.9)] = 0.139, meaning that roughly 13.9% of the variance is attributable to the 
country-level. These results indicate that in a further analysis it would be appropriate to look at the 
country-level variables to account for such variance. 
The effect of having skilled labor and a firm’s age becomes not statistically significant and the 
coefficients change their sign to negative once the study introduces the dummy variable for the state 
ownership and size of firms in the industry. Some control variables may be correlated with each other, for 
example: state ownership and age, size and exporter status, size and number of skilled employees, size 
and age, exporter and foreign ownership, or importer and exporter status (see Table 1.8). Some industry 
characteristics such as firms’ exporter status might be captured by the variable pertinent to this study such 
as the rank of the industry in the export portfolio of the country (measured in 2007). The rank value has 
been re-coded with a value equal to 1 if the industry is ranked from top 1 to 4, and a value equal to 0 
otherwise. The coefficient on top four export industries is positive and statistically significant at 90% 




confidence level, meaning that the industries ranked as the top four in the country’s export portfolio, on 
average, tend to be more productive. For the subsequent analysis, it was decided to drop the exporter 
status as it seems to be measured by the dummy variable for the industry’s rank in the country’s export 
portfolio. 
 
Hypothesis 1: industry protection 
To test the first hypothesis, the study uses the industry protection variables: the applied tariffs 
(weighted) and non-tariff barriers (frequency ratios). Models 10-16 (see Table 1.11) show the effect of 
industry-level policies on a measure of firm productivity.  Because the alternative hypothesis is 
directional, two conditions need to be met. First, the printed probability has to be divided by 2 before 
being compared to the alpha level 0.05 set prior to the beginning of the analysis. Second, the coefficient 
has to be consistent in directionality with the alternative hypothesis.  
The coefficients on applied tariffs (import weighted) for 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2008 are negative and 
their p-values divided by two are less than 0.05. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis and accept the 
alternative hypothesis that for firms in all industries, the applied import weighted tariffs are negatively 
associated with firm TFP once we control for industry characteristics. To see if the effect of trade-related 
policies varies for those top 4 industries, the study uses the interaction term between trade-related policies 
and the dummy variable “Rank 1-4” (Models 17 and 19). For firms in the top four export industries, the 
alternative hypothesis on the negative effect of applied import tariffs has been supported. A one-unit 
increase in the average applied tariff (import-weighted, 2008) for firms in the top four export industries is 
associated with an expected decrease in firm TFP of 1.96. 
For firms in all industries, a coefficient on a measure of non-tariff barriers is not statistically 
significant so we cannot be reasonably sure that it is other than zero. However, for firms in the top four 
export industries, the coefficient is negative. The potential explanation for non-significance of non-tariff 
barriers is the lack of reliable data because that measure is available only for 1999 and for selected 
countries (9 countries).  




These findings support the proposition made in H1 on industry protection measured by applied import 
tariffs (weighted) that it is negatively correlated with firm TFP. The results hold for various industry 
characteristics. It should be noted that industries ranked as top four in the country’s export portfolio, on 
average, perform better. The results hold when the study controls for EU membership and introduces the 
interaction between EU membership and rank of the industry in the country’s export portfolio (Models 18 
and 20).  
It should also be noted that previous state ownership and size have a significant positive effect on 
firm productivity in the ECA region. 
Hypothesis 2: trade agreements 
Since there is a statistically significant variation at the country-level, the study incorporates the country-
level predictors into the model. That can be done when testing the second hypothesis H2. As expected, 
there is a high correlation between membership in various trade agreements and regional blocks such EU, 
WTO, and OECD, as well as CIS, GUUAM, EurAsEc, and oil and gas exporter status. Thus, the study 
focuses on EU and WTO only. From the results of the Models 21a-24a, we can see that the variance 
component for the random intercept at the country level became not statistically significant once the study 
introduced EU or WTO membership (see Table 1.12). This suggests that the study may be justified in 
constraining the effect to be fixed.  
The variance component corresponding to the dummy variable for the four top export industries and 
cross-level interactions between membership in EU/WTO and the dummy variable for the industry being 
in the top four in the country’s export portfolio are not statistically significant. Such interaction allows 
testing if the effect of the industry being in the top four in the country’s export portfolio varies between 
countries. It seems that the difference is not statistically significant. The AIC and BIC statistics reported 
in STATA are given in smaller-is-better form. Comparing both the AIC and BIC statistics in Table 1.11, 
it is clear that the final Models 21-24 are more preferable to the previous models because the fit measured 
by AIC and BIC statistics is lower. 




Overall, across all industries, these results support the hypothesis that membership in the EU or WTO 
is positively associated with firm productivity, measured as total factor productivity and aggregated to the 
industry-level. However, the effect does not differ depending on the rank that industry holds in the 
country’s export portfolio. 
 
Hypothesis 3: import tariffs on key intermediate inputs 
The effect of applied import-weighted tariffs on intermediate inputs, such as key machinery and 
equipment, is negative and statistically significant in the case of total factor productivity of firms in the 
top four export industries (see Table 1.13, Model 25 a). The study introduces the cross-level interaction in 
the model between the country’s characteristics, such as membership in the EU, and the dummy variable 
for the industry being in the top four in the nation’s export portfolio.  
For firms in all industries, the effect is not statistically significant. Thus, we can be reasonably sure 
that the coefficient for input tariffs for firms in the top four export industries is negative and statistically 
significant (see Models 25a-26a).  
Hypotheses 4-5: VAT and VAT refund period 
Since the data on value added tax is measured at the country level, the study introduces an 
interaction between the measure of value added tax (VAT) and industry control variables such as a 
dummy for the industry being the top four in the country’s export portfolio (Rank 1-4). The results of 
such model are displayed in Table 1.14 . For firms in the top four export industries, the effect of the VAT 
is positive. For firms in all industries, we cannot be reasonably sure that the effect of a value added tax 
rate (VAT in 2009) is other than zero.  
The results testing for the effect of the refund period required to obtain the VAT refund on firm 
productivity are provided in Model 27 a-b (see Table 1.14). Since this variable is measured at the country 
level, the study introduces the cross-level interaction between the time period to obtain the tax refund and 
the dummy variable for the industry being in the top four. For firms in the top four export industries, the 
effect of the time period to obtain the VAT refund is not statistically significant. For firms in all 




industries, the effect is negative and statistically significant effect in case of firm performance measured 
by the TFP. It appears that this hypothesis is supported only for firms across all industries; a longer time 
period to reinstate the VAT is associated with a decrease in the average firm productivity measured by the 
TFP. The results under the alternative hypotheses H4 and H5 also hold after the study controls for EU 
membership (see Models 29 and 30). 
Hypothesis 6: export processing zone 
For firms in the top four export industries, the coefficient for the export processing zone is not 
statistically significant, so we cannot be sure that the effect is other than zero. For firms in all industries, 
the coefficient is negative; however, it becomes non-significant once we control for EU membership (see 
Table 1.15, Model 33a). There are some country–level random effects, as expected. Membership in the 
EU accounts for most of the variation at the country-level. The cross-level interactions between EU 
membership and the dummy variable for the industry rank are not statistically significant. 
Hypotheses 7-9: non-tariff barriers to trade 
Since the number of days to clear customs is measured at the country level, we can allow the cross-
level interaction between this variable and the dummy for the industry being in the top four in the 
country’s export portfolio. The interaction is not statistically significant; thus, for firms in the top four 
export industries, we cannot be reasonable sure that the effect of non-tariff barriers, measured as the 
number of days to clear exports/imports, is something other than zero (see Table 1.16, Models 34 and 35).  
The alternative hypothesis on the negative effect of non-tariff barriers, measured as the number of 
documents to export/import, has not been supported for firms in the top four export industries. For firms 
in all industries, the hypothesis has been supported in the case of the number of documents to import (see 
Table 1.16, Models 36 and 37). 
The alternative hypothesis on the negative effect of non-tariff barriers, measured as a cost per 
container to export/import, has not been supported for firms in the top four export industries. For firms in 
all industries, the hypothesis has been supported for firm TFP (see Table 1.16, Models 38 and 39). 
Hypothesis 10: compliance with industry standards 




The positive effect of compliance with industry standards, measured as a dummy variable=1 if firms 
have an internationally recognized quality certificate, has been supported for firms in the top four export 
industries. It is suggesting that better compliance with industry standards may have a more positive 
impact on firm productivity (see Table 1.17, Models 40-42). The results hold after the study controls for 
EU membership.  
Robustness 
 We run several additional analyses not presented here for the sake of brevity, to verify that the 
findings are not explained by other reasons and to confirm the robustness of the results. The alternative 
explanations were not supported. First, we used alternative measures and found that they yield similar 
results. We used the labor productivity (sales over a number of employees) as an alternative measure of 
firm productivity. We controlled for firm size using measures of sales in place of labor. We also analyzed 
whether the timing and pace of targeted reforms affected the findings. We used the measures of import 
tariffs for different years. The results of these analyses support the same conclusions reported above. The 
results have been checked for robustness by carrying a similar analysis using the benchmark countries. 
The benchmark countries include high-income OECD countries such as Germany, Spain, Ireland, 
Portugal, South Korea, and Greece.  
Similar to Topalova and Khandelwal (2010), we carry a test for political protection by regressing 
the change in output import tariffs between 2002 and 2008 on industrial characteristics such as sales and 
the number of employees, since these are the only variables available for the initial year 2002. It is also 
possible to add some industry characteristics measured in 2005; however, one has to be cautious when 
interpreting the results. The results are presented in Table 1.18. The table indicates no statistical 
correlation between changes in output import tariffs and of any industry characteristics except the share of 
unskilled workers in 2005 (columns 1-3). In case of regressing changes in import tariffs on key 
intermediate inputs, most variables turn out to be statistically significant (columns 4-6). 




Also, to investigate whether policymakers adjusted tariffs in response to industry's productivity 
levels, the study regresses the future measures of trade protection (2008) on industry productivity levels in 
2005 (see Table 1.19).  
DISCUSSION 
This study finds that, in most instances, targeted policies do not show a significant impact on 
manufacturing firms’ TFP. That is an unexpected finding; it somewhat contradicts the seminal work by 
Lin (2009), which has been used as a basis for this study. Lin (2009, 2012) argues that a country should 
target industries that follow a country’s comparative advantage. Lin also predicts that by targeting 
industries with specific policies, a country is able to incentivize the industries within its sphere of 
comparative advantage to invest in value added activities, which increase TFP. 
One of the potential reasons as to why targeted trade policies tend not to work in the ECA region is a 
lack of comprehensive industry-level data. In the few instances when the hypotheses were supported, the 
data was available for the industry-level. Thus, it is possible to conclude that the actual data is critical 
(industry- versus country-level) and can dramatically change the results. Once additional industry-level 
data becomes available, it is entirely plausible that this study may find more evidence in favor of targeted 
policies impacting the manufacturing firm TFP. However, at this juncture, the limited availability of 
industry-level data prevents the author from conducting further analysis. 
Another potential explanation is related to the older literature that precedes Lin (2009). Until very 
recently, the majority of the literature on economic development opposed using targeted trade policies to 
favor certain industries with the goal of increasing a country’s overall productivity. It advocates using 
reforms that affect all industries, rather than reforms that target only certain industries. The reasoning was 
that targeting particular industries is accompanied by three major challenges such as: identifying such 
industries, tackling a severe information asymmetry between government and firms, and preventing 
higher rent-seeking by firms, i.e., corruption (World Bank Development Report, 2005). Hence, according 
to that literature, targeting certain industries would promote/breed corruptive practices, and most benefits 
expected from implementing targeted policies would be undermined. The earlier literature clearly 




identifies that targeted trade-related policies would not work in improving firm productivity due to issues 
of corruption. Inter alia, while Lin’s New Structural Economic Theory acknowledges corruption and 
suggests that by adopting policies to target specific industries within their comparative advantages, 
corruption would be mitigated in the long-run when governments remove their target policies aimed at 
specific industries. Lin argues that firms entering those industries that have already been identified as 
being in the sphere of a country’s comparative advantage become more viable as opposed to firms 
entering in industries not classified within the country’s sphere of comparative advantage. Hence, if we 
are to fully prove that targeted government trade policies for certain industries do, in fact, yield higher 
TFP, in the future studies, we should account for the effect for corruption.  
This article has some limitations because we do not distinguish between the strategic policies initiated 
by respective governments and the policies imposed by the WTO, or the members of a corresponding 
regional block such as EU or CIS. Future research could potentially focus on distinguishing the effects of 
the initiated and imposed policies. Also, ideally, to fully exploit the value chain analysis, the study 
requires connecting producers to supporting services. Unfortunately, the lack of data precludes the study 
from incorporating this type of information in its value chain analysis. Therefore, the study is limited to 
simply tracing manufactured products to final destination and identifying the industry standards existing 
in those markets.  
Since we use deflated revenues rather than physical product to describe output and calculate firm 
productivity, most likely such study would suffer from a blurred distinction between the actual factor 
productivity and price-cost mark-ups. It creates a bias in case of production differentiation or market 
power differences between firms (Arnold, 2005). One of the drawbacks of using the Enterprise Surveys is 
missing data. That issue is being handled by interpolating the missing data. Also, the way the Enterprise 
Surveys selected firms is considered to be somewhat skewed for the purpose of this dissertation. To keep 
comparability with previous surveys and across countries, the two industries were selected in all 
countries: the manufacture of food products and beverages, and manufacture of apparel and fur. Another 
major limitation is a lack of consistent firm-level data for that region that would go back in time. Thus, to 




test the hypotheses, the study uses the manufacturing firm TFP data for the year of 2009 as the benchmark 
to gauge the effect of targeted trade-related policies. For the benchmark countries, firm-level data is only 
available for 2005, thus, the study used the data for that particular year. 
For future research, the study could be extended to apply to services and/or multiproduct firms. As 
more data becomes available, the study would aim to connect producers in industries with comparative 
advantage to supporting services, in order to fully utilize the value chain analysis. As more waves of 
Enterprise Surveys become available, it may be worthwhile to split the data into pre- and post-crisis 
periods and extend the study to other regions and benchmark countries. Given that the global financial 
crisis is still unfolding, the effects of changes in trade policies can be better ascertained in the future. 
Another important area for future research is to evaluate how the relationship between the targeted trade-
related policies and firm productivity changes depending on the level of corruption. Such analysis has not 
been done before; hence, this would contribute greatly to the existing literature, as well as to our 
understanding of the point at which targeted policies would result in greater TFP. 
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Basic Value Chain 
 



















Merchandise Exports Decomposition, % of Merchandise Exports in the ECA Region 
 
Source: WDI 2011, World Bank. 
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 Trade Policy Variable Response Firm Industry Country Year Source 
1 Overall Protection        




World Integrated Trade 




       









Yes/No   x  International Trade 
Statistics 2010; EIA, 
Global Preferential Trade 
Agreements Database 
(GPTAD), and various 
sources for EU, OECD 
membership (as of 
August 2011) 
3 Import Tariffs on Key 
Intermediate Inputs 








x  1997, 
2002, 
2008 
World Integrated Trade 
Solution Database WB; 
Key Intermediate Inputs 
defined by author (see 
Table 3.4) 
4 Value Added Tax 
(VAT) 
       
4.1 VAT rate VAT2009 %   x 2009 Taxes at a Glance 2009 
PwC; Cedidlová,M.; 
Redinová, H. (2010) VAT 
in the EU (2000 – 2010) 




4.2 Time to Reinstate VAT refund09 Number of 
months 
  x 2009 Taxes at a Glance 2009 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
5 Export Processing 
Zone 
       
5.1 Dummy for industry 
being in the zone 
zone Yes/No  x   IFC FIAS 2008, ILO 
2007, US & Foreign 
Commercial Service and 
US Department of State 
6 Non-Tariff Barriers: 
Days to Clear 
Customs 
       
6.1 Days to Clear Exports d4, q8a Number   x  Enterprise Surveys 




7 Non-Tariff Barriers: 
Amount of Paperwork 
       
7.1 Documents to Export docexport07 Number   x 2007-
2009 
Doing Business 
7.2 Documents to Import docimport07 Number   x  
8 Non-Tariff Barriers: 
Cost to export/import 
       
8.1 Cost to Export costexport07 Number   x 2007-
2009 
Doing Business 
8.2 Cost to Import costimport07 Number   x 




b8 Yes/No x x   Enterprise Surveys 
Source: Adapted from IFC FIAS (2007). 
Note: DB – Doing Business, World Bank, ES – Enterprise Surveys, World Bank, GPTAD – Global Preferential 
Trade Agreement Database, World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), UNCTAD – United Nations 





















Armenia’s Exports by Cluster, 2007 
Armenia 
Services Clusters Excluded 
Exports by Cluster, 2007 
Cluster Export Value 











Metal Mining and 
Manufacturing 




$164.12 1997 2007 60 n.a. 372  
Agricultural 
Products 








$33.05 1997 2007 76 4 369  
Plastics $27.15 1997 2007 93 0 356  
Processed Food $15.60 1997 2007 106 0 362 1554, 
1553, 
1520 
Power and Power 
Generation 
Equipment 
$10.03 1997 2007 67 0  3110 
Chemical 
Products 
$7.11 1997 2007 110 0 351, 352  






$6.71 1997 2007 89 0  3200 
Production 
Technology 
$4.87 1997 2007 95 0 382  
Fishing and 
Fishing Products 
$4.67 1997 2007 108 0  1512 




$3.36 1997 2007 89 0  3100 
Source: Prof. Michael E. Porter, International Cluster Competitiveness Project, Institute for Strategy and 
Competitiveness, Harvard Business School; Richard Bryden, Project Director. 
Note: n.a. – not available. Value Rank indicates the nation's rank among all reporting nations for goods exports in 
the cluster. It reflects the magnitude of the size of the nation’s cluster when compared to the rest of the world. The 
Rank indicates the cluster’s rank among the nation’s clusters; it shows the importance of that cluster to the nation’s 
exports.  





Defining Key Intermediate Inputs 
 
Source: author, based on input-output tables for select countries.





Control Variables from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys 







Percentage of skilled production workers in 
firm's staff 
Percent l4a/l1 
 Size of the firm Categorical variable taking value: 1 = small 
(<20 employees), 2 = medium (20-99 




 Age of the firm 
 
Difference between the year that the plant 




  Dummy for 
ownership 
Dummy variable taking value 1 if the firm 
previously belonged to the government 
Yes/No ECAq5 
 Dummy for foreign 
direct investment 
 
Variable taking value 1 if any part of the 
capital of the firm is foreign 
 
Yes/No b2b 
 Dummy for exporter Variable taking value 1 if firm exports 
directly 
Yes/No d3c 
 Dummy for 
importer 
Variable taking value 1 if firm imports Yes/No d13 


















Production Function Variables and General Information at Plant Level 
 
1. Sales: Used as the measure of output for the production function estimation. Sales are defined as 
total annual sales. The series are deflated by using the country-level Wholesale Price Index (WPI), 
base 2005.  
2. Employment: Total number of permanent and temporary workers. 
3. Total labor costs: Total expenditures on personnel, including wages, salaries, bonuses, etc. The 
series are deflated by using the country-level Wholesale Price Index (WPI), base 2005. 
4. Materials: Total costs of intermediate and raw materials used in production (excluding fuel). The 
series are deflated by using the country-level Wholesale Price Indexes (WPI), base 2005. 
5. Capital stock: Current replacement value of fixed assets (machinery and equipment). The series are 
deflated by using the country-level Gross Fixed Capital Formation growth rate. 
6. Industrial classification: i) food and beverages; ii) textiles; iii) wearing apparel; iv) leather; v) 
wood products; vi) furniture; vii) paper products; viii) printing; ix) chemical products; x) rubber; xi) 
plastics; xii) glass; xiii) basic metals; xiv) fabricated metal products, excluding machinery and 
equipment; xv) machinery and equipment, excluding electrical; xvi) electrical machinery apparatus, 
appliances and supplies; xvii) transport equipment; xviii) professional and scientific equipment; xix) 
other. 
9. Regional classification: i) Central; ii) North-West; iii) Siberia; iv) South; v) Ural  





















Sample Countries in the ECA Region 
 
Source: Enterprise Surveys, World Bank. 















         Total          588      100.00
                                                   
    Montenegro            2        0.34      100.00
       Croatia           11        1.87       99.66
      Bulgaria           17        2.89       97.79
      Slovenia           15        2.55       94.90
      Slovakia           10        1.70       92.35
     Lithuania           10        1.70       90.65
        Latvia           13        2.21       88.95
       Hungary           17        2.89       86.73
Czech Republic            5        0.85       83.84
       Estonia           11        1.87       82.99
        Kyrgyz           19        3.23       81.12
       Armenia           44        7.48       77.89
         FYROM           31        5.27       70.41
    Azerbaijan           38        6.46       65.14
        Bosnia           26        4.42       58.67
       Moldova           61       10.37       54.25
    Kazakhstan           31        5.27       43.88
       Romania           55        9.35       38.61
        Poland           29        4.93       29.25
        Russia           13        2.21       24.32
    Uzbekistan           31        5.27       22.11
       Ukraine           26        4.42       16.84
    Tajikistan           29        4.93       12.41
       Georgia           19        3.23        7.48
       Belarus           19        3.23        4.25
       Albania            6        1.02        1.02
                                                   
          Code        Freq.     Percent        Cum.
   a.1 Country  





















Table 1.8  



























HLM Results: Firm Control Variables 
 Dependent Variable is Log of TFP (2009) 
 
       Note: significant at: *** - 99%, ** - 95%, * - 90% confidence level.   
 
 





HLM Results: Applied Import Weighted Tariffs and NTB Frequency Ratio 
 Dependent Variable is Log of TFP (2009) 
    
Note: significant at: *** - 99%, ** - 95%, * - 90% confidence level.





HLM Results: Membership in EU and WTO 
Dependent Variable is Log of TFP  
 




























HLM Results: Import Tariffs on Key Inputs: Machinery and Equipment 
Fixed Effects  Input Tariff Model 25a Model 26a  
Intercept γ00 Intercept γ00 28.94*** 20.13***  










Firm Age  





















Trade (country-level) γ01 EU   18.39**  






Random Effects        
Intercept (country) u0k   349.8*** 189.5  
Control (industry) u1k Rank 1-4    739.7**  
Trade (industry) u2k      
Residual  εjk   2120.9*** 1989.6***  
Model Fit Statistics Model Fit Statistics     
Deviance Deviance 6192.7 6137.7  
AIC AIC 6214.7 6169.7  
BIC BIC 6262.8 6239.7  

























HLM Results: Value Added Tax (VAT) and VAT Refund Period  
Dependent Variable is Log of TFP (2009) 
 

























HLM Results: Export Processing Zone 
Dependent Variable is Log of TFP (2009) 
 
 























HLM Results: Non-Tariff Barriers 
Dependent Variable is Log of TFP (2009) 
 
Note: significant at: *** - 99%, ** - 95%, * - 90% confidence level. 
The variable “Days to Clear Customs (exports/imports)” is measured at the firm level through the Enterprise Surveys; however, due to the high number of missing values 
the study had to use the country averages to fill out the missing data. 





HLM Results: Industry Standards 
Dependent Variable is Log of TFP (2009) 
 





















Endogeneity Test 1: Trade Policies 
Dependent Variables are Changes in Output Import Tariffs and  
Import Tariffs on Key Inputs between 2002 and 2008 . Industry-level data. 
 Dep.Variable – Change in 
Output Import Tariffs  
(2002-2008) 
Dep.Variable – Change in Import 
Tariffs on Key Inputs (2002-2008) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of Sales (2002) -0.173 -0.173 -0.044 -0.489*** -0.465*** -0.432*** 
Log of Employment 
(2002) 
0.266 0.263 0.384 0.607*** 
 
0.553*** 0.582*** 
Percentage owned by 
government (2005) 
 0.001 -0.003  0.021* 0.021 
Share of unskilled 
workers (2005) 
  -8.27***   -2.09** 
F-stat 0.39 0.26 5.54 9.57 7.38 6.87 
p-value 0.678 0.855 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
R
2
 0.001 0.001 0.041 0.036 0.041 0.052 
Observations:  250 250 250 250 250 250 



































Endogeneity Test 2: Trade Policies 
Dependent Variables are Output Import Tariffs and  
Import Tariffs on Key Inputs in 2008. Industry-level data. 
 Dep.Variable –Import 
Tariffs (2008) 
Dep.Variable –
Import Tariffs on 
Key Inputs (2008) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Log of TFP (2005) -0.003  0.003*  






Year, Industry and 
Country dummies 
included 
yes yes yes yes 
F-stat 22.21 21.34 74.22 82.69 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R
2
 0.678 0.690 0.876 0.896 
Observations 250 250 250 250 
       Note: significant at: *** - 99%, ** - 95%, * - 90% confidence level. Industry-level data. 
 
 
